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EXTRATERRITORIAL DIVORCE-WILLIAMS v. 
NORTH CAROLINA II 
ERNEST G. LORENZENt 
Williams v. North Carolina I 1 simplified the law on interstate dh·orce 
bY compelling the rP~ogmtlOn ol foreign diyorces it the petitioner wa~ 
domicilea in the state granting the diyorce, and without reference to 
whlch ot the spouses was at fault.· In doing so, it overruled the doc- -
tnne of the Hailiiock case,:: according to which the domiciliary state ot 
the respondent, who was not personally before the dh·orce court, need 
not recognize the foreign divorce. It also did away ,,,ith the special 
doctrine laid dovm in Atherton v. Atherton, 3 which made the recognition 
of the foreign decree upon substituted serdce compulsory if it v:as 
rendered by the courts of the last matrimonial domicil, that is, of the 
state in which the parties last lived together as husband and '\if e. 
Williams v. North Carolina I was tried on the assumption that North 
Carolin<;~. had the power under the Haddock doctrine to attack the 
Nevada decree because the Nevada court had no personal jurisdiction 
over the respondent. For that reason it did not challenge the finding 
of the Nevada court that the petitioners had acquired a domicil in 
Nevada. The Supreme Court of the United States did not find it 
necessary, therefore, to discuss the subject of domicil as a prerequisite 
for divorce jurisdiction. The existence of domicil in Nevada became 
the decisive issue upon review by certiorari, in TT'illiams ''· N'ortlt Caro-
lina II, 4 of the judgment of the Supreme Court of ~orth Carolina 
which convicted the Nevada divorcees of bigamous cohabitation. ti 
fEdward J. Phelps Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School. 
1. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). See Lorenzen, Haddad: v. Had-
dock Overruled (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 341. 
2. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906). 
3. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901). 
4. Williams v. North Carolina II. 65 Sup. Ct. 1092 (U. S. 1945). 
5. The charge to the jury by the trial court is summarized in the opinion of the Su-
preme Court as follows: "The trial court charged that the State had the burden of provin~; 
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) each petitioner \Yas lawfully married to one per~on; 
(2} thereafter each petitioner contracted a second marriage ,.,;th another pen:on outside 
North Carolina; (3) the spouses of petitioners were living at the time of this Eecond mar-
riage; {4) petitioners cohabited v.ith one anot.;er in North Carolina alter the Eecond mar-
riage. The burden, it was charged, then devolved upon petitioners 'to E:lti~:f:t the trial jury, 
not beyond a reasonable doubt nor by the greater weight of the evidence, but Eimplr to 
satisfy' the jury from all the evidence that petitioners were domiciled in Ncv::~da at the 
time they obtained their divorces. The court further charged that 'the recitation' of b:ma 
fide domicil in the Nevada decree 'IYas 'prima facie e\idence' sufficient to warrant a finding 
of domicil in Nevada but not compelling 'such an inference.' If the jury found, as the:,• 
were told, that petitioners had domicils in North Carolina and went to Nevada '~:impl:,• 
and solely for the purpose of obtaining' divorces, intending to return to North Carolin;:1 on 
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The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the convictions, 
with Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for a majority of six. 11North 
Carolina," he says, 11did not fail in appreciation or application of fed-
eral standards of full faith and credit. Appropriate weight was given 
to the finding of domicil in the Nevada decrees, and that finding was 
allowed to be overturned only by relevant standards of proof. There 
is nothing to suggest that the issue was not fairly submitted to th~,, 
jury and that it was not fairly assessed on cogent evidence.' '6 
Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting, contended that domicil as a test 
for the recognition of judgments of sister states had been imported into 
the Constitution by the judges and had outlived its usefulness; that the 
decrees of divorce, being valid in Nevada, were entitled to full faith and 
credit in the courts of all sister states, but that, if full faith and credit 
were not to be accorded them, the constitutional policy should at least 
be approximated by not allowing a denial of full faith and credit by any 
standard of proof less than that generally required to overturn or dis-
regard a judgment upon direct attack. 7 
Mr. Justice Black in a dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by 
Mr. Justice Douglas, charged the majority of the Court with having 
made domicil a purely federal question, whereas the full faith and 
credit clause of the Constitution and the supporting act of Congress 
had declared it to be a state question; he also criticized making domicil 
an indispensable requirement under the due process clause by regard-
ing the Nevada divorce invalid in Nevada, and objected most vigor-
ously to this latest expansion of federal power by adding a new content 
to the due process clause. 
Approval of the decision in Williams v. North Carolina II depends in 
the first place upon one's personal reaction to divorce in general, and 
to migratory divorce in particular. If one does not believe in 11easy" 
divorce, one would readily concede that the Nevada divorce of North 
Carolinians after a six weeks' stay in Nevada is not entitled to recogni-
tion. On the other hand, if one feels that spouses should be allowed to 
terminate their marriage relationship when reasonable grounds for 
such desire exist and the divorce law of the state in which they live is 
very restrictive, one naturally sympathizes with their attempt to seek 
such divorce under the law of some state having a more liberal divorce 
policy. 
Looked at solely from the standpoint of the individuals involved, 
obtaining them, they never lost their North Carolina domicils nor acquired new domlclls 
in Nevada. Domicil, the jury were instructed, was that place where a person has volun-
tarily fixed his abode • • • not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present 
intention of making it llis home, either permanently or for an indefinite and unlimited 
length of time." I d. at 1097-8. 
6. Id. at 1098. 
7. Id. at 1109. 
D 
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without regard to state and national interests, the majority '\ievr 
seems very severe. \Ve have here two persons convicted of bigamy and 
sent to prison because they took advantage of the dh·orce laws of a 
sister state, no doubt under the advice of coum:el that the Nevada 
divorce would be recognized as valid in North Carolina. Acting upon 
that advice, they went to Nevada, stayed there the requisite time of 
si.~ weeks, complied with the Nevada law in all respects, obtained their 
divorces, married each other in Nevada in conformity "ith Nevada 
law, and then returned to North Carolina as husband and v.ife. One 
would think, then, that the parties having obtained a dh·orce in a sister 
state through regular judicial proceedings, they were free to remarry in 
Nevada, and that having entered into a lawful marriage in Nevada, 
their status should be recognized everywhere in this country. To the 
observation that the Nevada divorce legislation was motivated by 
commercial and financial considerations,8 for the very purpose of at-
tracting non-residents, the supporters of this view reply by calling 
attention to the fact that the si.'{ weeks' residence requirement is inter-
preted by the courts of Nevada as meaning domicil and that the estab-
lishment of such domicil has to be proved at the trial in Nevada before 
the divorce is granted. That being the case, the conclusion is drav.n 
that Nevada has acquired with respect to the marital relations of the 
parties the interest formerly possessed by the State of North Carolina 
and still possessed by that state with reference to the other spouses. 
Such argumentation is, however, largely fictitious. It has been 
estimated that 8,616 divorces were granted in Nevada in 1942 and 
11,399 in 1943,9 the great majority of which must have been obtained 
by non-residents who went to Nevada solely for divorce purposes, re-
maining there only the required si.~ weeks. All the while they con-
templated returning to their home states immediately after their 
divorces were secured, yet they all swore falsely that they intended to 
make Nevada their permanent home, having been warned by local 
counsel that, unless they did so, they would be out of court. On ad-
vice of counsel they also took steps which would be accepted by the 
Nevada courts as corroborating their sworn statement but were ac-
tually nothing more than sham and camouflage. Upon such evidence 
the courts find that they acquired a Nevada domicil. 
The naked fact in these migratory divorce cases is that no bona fide 
domicil is established in Nevada. The same was true in Williams v. 
North Carolina II. That being the case, and in the absence of other 
bases for the jurisdiction of the Nevada courts, a divorce decree in such 
circumstances appears more like an interference by Nevada in the 
8. In 1943 it is estimated that Nevada received more than $500,000 in divorce fees. 
See RABEL, THE CoNFLICT OF LAws-A Co~tPARATIVE STUDY (1945) 394, n. 18. 
9. Ibid. 
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marital relations of North Carolinians than, as Justice Black claims, 
an unwarranted assumption of power on the part of North Carolina 
"to regulate marriages within Nevada's territorial boundaries." to 
However, the harshness of the result in such cases, leading to convic-
tion of bigamy and bastardization of later offspring might lead one to 
sympathize with the minority of the Supreme Court for their efforts to 
find ways and means to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina. They point out that, the existence of domicil having 
been found by the divorce court in Nevada and recited upon the record, 
the burden of disproving the establishment of a Nevada domicil should 
have been upon the State of North Carolina,11 and that the charge to 
the jury had failed to impose such burden.12 
According to Mr. Justice Black the judgment might have been re-
versed also on the ground that under the particular circumstances of 
the case North Carolina had no longer a sufficient interest in the marital 
relation to be allowed to question the validity of the Nevada divorces 
in a criminal proceeding for bigamous cohabitation.13 But such an 
argument is difficult to sustain. Says Mr. Justice White, "The princi-
ple dominating the subject is that the marriage relation is so intenvoven 
with public policy that the consent of the parties is impotent to dis-
solve it contrary to the law of the domicil." 14 The state is vitally 
interested in the marriage relation because it affects society as a whole, 
its welfare and continued well-being. This interest is based upon a 
general public order and sound public policy, in pursuance whereof 
conditions are prescribed upon which persons may enter into and then 
dissolve the marital relation. To enforce such policy the state provides 
penalties for the violation of its marriage laws. As the majority of the 
Court a;;sert, the state interest is not identical with that of the parties 
to the marital relation. The fact that in the instant case the other 
spouses did not object to the divorce, that one of them had died and 
the other remarried, would, therefore, be immaterial. Were the mar-
riage relation not intenvoven with public policy the parties would be 
free to terminate it at will. 
The minority of the Court contend that even in the absence of the 
special facts referred to by Mr. Justice Black the full faith and credit 
clause of the Federal Constitution should prevent the State of North 
Carolina from challenging the Nevada divorces in a criminal proceed-
ing. On the other hand, if the suit is one to terminate maintenance and 
support on account of the dissolution of the marriage, as in the case of 
10. 65 Sup. Ct. at 1111. 
11. See Justice Black's dissent, 65 Sup. Ct. at 1116. 
12. See note 5 supra. 
13. 65 Sup. Ct. at 1109. 
14. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 41 (1903). 
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Esenwein v. Com11wnu•ealth of Pemzsyhmzia,15 decided contempora-
neously \vith the TVilliams case, the same minority are ready to admit 
that the Nevada divorce decrees may be challenged on the ground that 
the parties had not acquired a bona fide domicil in Nevada.1G Accord-
ing to this view, North Carolina must recognize migratory N'evada 
divorces if their non-recognition would .make bigamists of the parties 
obtaining them if they remarry, and bastards of the offspring of their 
second marriage, but would allow them to be attacked on the issue of 
domicil where maintenance and support of the other spouse or the 
children are involved. 
The ultimate question, therefore, is what are the respective rights, 
15. 65 Sup. Ct. 1118 (U.S. 1945). 
16. Mr. Justice Douglas seeks to justify this distinction in the following manner: 
"I think it is important to keep in mind a basic difference betwoxm the prob-
lem of marital capacity and the problem of support. 
"We held in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 37 L. 
Ed. 279, 143 A. L. R. 1273, that a Nevada divorce decree granted to a spOU!::U domi-
ciled there was entitled to full faith and cr.:dit in North Carolina. That ca!::e in-
volved the question of marital capacity. The spou~e who obtained the Nevada 
decree 1vas being prosecuted in North Carolina for lhing \\ith tlw one "'oman whom 
Nevada recognized as his lawful v.ife. Quite different con::iderations would have 
been presented if North Carolina had merely sought to compel the husb::md to 
support his deserted "ife and children, whether the Nevada decree had made no 
provision for the support of the former \\ife and children or had pro\ided an 
amount deemed insufficient by North Carolina. In other words, it is not app:mmt 
that the spouse who obtained the decree can defeat an action for maintenance or 
support in another State by sho,•.ing that he was domiciled in the State which 
awarded him the divorce decree. It is one thing if the spouse from whom the decr;;:c 
of divorce is obtained appears or is pcrsonall:o,• served. See Yarborough v. Yar-
borough, 290 U. S. 202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269, 90 A.L.R. 924; Davis v. 
Da>is, 305 U. S. 32, 59 Sup. Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed. 26, 113 A.L.R. 1518. But I am not 
convinced that in absence of an appearance or personal service tlte decree need b<1 
given full faith and credit when it comes to maintenance or support of the other 
spouse or the children. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. St.i5. The 
problem under the full faith and credit clause is to accommodate as fully as po:dble 
the conflicting interests of the two States. See l\Iagnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 
320 U.S. 430, 447, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 217, 88 L. Ed. 149, 150 A.L.R. 413 (diE:::~:ntin~ 
opinion). The question of marital capacity v.ill often raise an irrccondlabl!.! conflict 
between the policies of the two States. See \Yilliams v. North Carolina, stzpra. 
One must give way in the larger interest of the federal union. But the ::o.mu conflict 
is not nece.."-.«arily present when it comes to maintcnanc<: or support. The State 
where the deserted 1\ife is domiciled has a deep concern in the welfare of thu family 
deserted by the head of the household. If he is required to support his former v.ife, 
he is not made a bigamist and the offspring of his ::econd marriage are not bastard-
ized. In that view Pennsylvania in this case might refuse to alter its former order 
of support or might enlarge it, even though Nevada in which the other spoU£~; was 
domiciled and obtained his divorce made a different provi£ion for support or none 
at all. See Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clau::e, 39 Ill. L. 
Rev. 1, 28." Esenwein v. Commonwealth of Pennsyh-ania, 65 Sup. Ct. 1119-20 
(U.S. 1945). 
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privileges and powers of the states of North Carolina and Nevada with 
respect to the marital relations of the parties before the court. Under 
the facts of the case, has Nevada the power to divorce the parties? 
Has it the power to do so, under the due process clause of the Federal 
Constitution, so far as the status of the parties in Nevada is concerrted? 
Has it this power, under the {ull faith and credit clause, so far as the 
recognition of the divorce by other states is concerned? Or does the 
power under the latter clause depend upon who seeks to attack the 
divorce, the power being recognized, as the minority of the Supreme 
Court would have it, if the State of North Carolina challenges the 
validity of the decree in a criminal proceeding, but denied if the action 
is for support and maintenance by the other spouse or children? The 
Supreme Court of the United States as interpreter of the Federal Con-
stitution being the ultimate judicial arbiter in these matters, where 
shall the line be drawn? 
Our law is extremely liberal in providing access to our courts. Gen-
erally speaking, they are open to all, residents and non-residents, citi-
zens and aliens. In transitory actions jurisdiction will be taken al-
though the cause of action has no connection with the state. All that 
is required is personal jurisdiction over the defendant. But jurisdiction 
for divorce is generally regarded as requiring some close connection 
between the individuals ·involved and the state of divorce, the con-
necting link being either domicil or nationality. 17 In Anglo-American 
law domicil has been commonly adopted as the jurisdictional test.18 It 
has seemed best to the English and American judges that family rela-
tions should be changed only by the courts of the state in which the 
parties had their home (domicil), such state having the principal in-
terest in those relations. 
But, says Mr. Justice Rutledge, the concept of domicil is too vague, 
for it depends upon a mental condition, which can afford no stable 
17. Nationality is frequently the test in continental countries. See RABEL, TllE CoN· 
FLICT OF LAWs-A ColtPARATIVE STUDY (1945) 397. 
18. The relinquishment of domicil or long continued residence as a requirement {or 
jurisdiction for divorce would lead to a serious dilemma in the matter of substituted serv· 
ice. Under the existing order such service is permitted in actions in rem or quasi in rem 
because the property or status is or is deemed to be within the state. In actions in personam 
it is allowed where the defendant has his domicil within the state [Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U. S. 457 (1940)), (perhaps) where a non-resident conducts a business within the state, ns 
regards causes of action arising out of that business [see Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Good· 
man, 294 U. S. 623 (1935)], and under the auto statutes, where a nonresident owner of an 
automobile causes injury to person or property within the state [Hess v. Pawloski, 274 
U. S. 352 (1927)). Substituted service in a divorce proceeding, when the defendant is not 
domiciled within the state, has been justified in the past on the ground that such a pro· 
ceeding relates to status, which is deemed to have a situs in the state in which either the 
petitioner or the respondent has his home, that is, his fixed connection with the state. With 
the abandonment of such connection there remains no basis upon which substituted service 
would meet our conceptions of due process of law. 
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test; it has been introduced into the Constitution by the judges and 
it is time that it should be eliminated as impractical and useless. True, 
domicil in this country has lost much of the stability it possessed in 
earlier times, and especially in England. People are in the habit of 
Changing their homes frequently from state to state. In many cases 
they have homes in several states. Again, married ·women are per-
mitted to have domicils different from their husbands'. Under present 
conditions, therefore, it is frequently difficult, if not impossible, to 
ascertain where the domicil of a person is. Furthermore, as the 
primary test of domicil is the intention to remain in the state perma-
nently or for an indefinite and unlimited time, there is the possibility 
that the parties may for certain purposes claim a fictitious domicil in a 
state. This is especially true in matters of divorce. 
\Vhat other test besides domicil could the Supreme Court adopt for 
jurisdiction for divorce? At this late date it could not say Yery well 
that a suit for divorce is an ordinary adversary proceeding which re-
quires only jurisdiction over the parties. In a divorce proceeding there 
must be something more than mere personal jurisdiction.11 l\IoreoYer, 
regarding the proceeding as one in personam would not solve the migra-
tory divorce problem e.xcept in the cases in which the respondent is 
'\\rilling to appear, for under the accepted doctrines an unv.illing re-
spondent cannot be brought before the court by substituted service. 
Could not mere residence on the part of the petitioner be regarded 
as a sufficient basis of jurisdiction for divorce, and substituted senice 
upon the respondent be allowed? From a technical point of view the 
answer is probably "yes," but in my opinion the Supreme Court ,•,isely 
refrained from taking this step. If the residence were for a reasonable 
period (in my former article 20 I suggested si.x months; Rabel feels that a 
year should be the minimum 21), it would seem that the respondent 
might properly be brought into court by substituted senice, in view 
of the fact that the petitioner would then have established a connection 
with the state sufficient to justify its changing his family relations. But 
if residence were accepted as a substitute for domicil, a state might 
reduce the requirement of residence to one or two days. That being the 
19. Mr. Justice Douglas in Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942), 
said, "We like·wise agree that it does not aid in the solution of the problem prcz!mtcd by 
this case to label these proceedings as proceedings in rem. Such a suit, however, is not a 
mere i1~ personam action." 
1\Ir. Justice Frankfurter in lVilliams v. North Carolina II, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 1096 
(U.S. 1945), said, "Although it is now settled that a suit for divorce is not an ordin;:u;,· ad-
versary proceeding, it does not promote analysis, as was recentlj• pointed out, to bb:ll 
divorce proceedings as actions in rem." 
Rabel says, "The fact is that American divorce lav; has outgrown the doctrine of juris-
diction in rem." Op. cit. supra note 17, at 404. 
20. Lorenzen, Haddock v. Haddock Orerrulcd (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 341, 352. 
21. RABEL, op. cit. supra note 17, at 460-1. 
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case, the Supreme Court as arbiter between the conflicting claims of 
North Carolina and Nevada could not very well adopt residence as a 
test for the determination of the power of Nevada to grant divorces 
which must be accepted as binding everywhere. If the Supreme Court 
as such arbiter had the power to fix a period of residence sufficient to 
establish a serious connection between the petitioner and the state of 
divorce, all would be well, but this involves a legislative rather than a 
judicial function and is thus not available to the courts. 
Depending as it does upon a state of mind, domicil admittedly does 
not furnish a satisfactory basis for our interstate divorce law because 
different courts and juries may draw different conclusions from the 
same facts, with the result that the divorce may be recognized in one 
state and not in another. The remedy, however, it would seem, does 
not lie with the courts, but with Congress, which can specify a period of 
residence which shall satisfy the full faith and credit requirements of 
the Federal Constitution. 22 
Mr. Justice Black strenuously objects to the e.xpansion of federal 
power by the majority of the Court in making domicil the test of the 
validity of the Nevada divorce decrees in Nevada under the due process 
clause. 23 His contention is not, of course, that there should be different 
jurisdictional requirements for the validity of divorces under the due 
process clause and the full faith and credit clause; he insists, rather, 
that the divorce and subsequent marriage are valid under the law of 
Nevada and for that reason must be recognized by North Carolina 
under the full faith and credit clause. As the majority of the Court 
have held in Williams v. North Carolina II that domicil is the jurisdic-
tional test for the compulsory recognition of the Nevada decrees by 
North Carolina, the same test should determine the validity of the 
divorce in Nevada under the due process clause, for under the support-
ing act of Congress with respect to the former clause the Nevada 
decrees are entitled elsewhere to the same faith and credit as they have 
in Nevada. 
Whereas the Supreme Court of the United States has had little 
occasion to discuss the validity of divorces from the standpoint of due 
process, it has pronounced itself in a number of cases on the validity of 
foreign divorce decrees under the full faith and credit clause. 24 Its 
22. Until Congress acts, it would seem, therefore, that the existence of a bona fide 
domicil in the state must remain an indispensable requisite for divorce jurisdiction. "Under 
our system of law," says Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "judicial power to grant a divorce--
jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicil." Williams v. North Carolina II, 
65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 1095 (U. S. 1945). 
23. Id. at 1114-6. 
24. In Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901), the New York courts declined to recognize o. 
Pennsylvania divorce obtained by the husband from his New York wife, the Pennsylvania 
law requiring bona fide residence (domicil) for one year. The respondent was served only 
constructively. It was found by the Pennsylvania court that the petitioner had not acquired 
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latest interpretation leads to the conclusion that a divorce decree must 
be recognized by all other states if the petitioner has acquired a bona 
fide domicil in the state of divorce, even though the respondent v:as 
brought before the court only by substituted service, but that without 
a bona fide domicil in the state the decree need not be recognized. 
The question remains whether approval should be given to Mr. Jus-
tice Rutledge's suggestion that if the test of domicil must be retained 
by the courts until Congress brings order into the divorce situation, the 
Supreme Court should not allow the Nevada divorce decrees to be 
attacked in other states by standards of proof other than those available 
in the case of direct attack. 25 If as between North Carolina and Nevada 
a bona fide domicil in Pennsylvania. Under th~e circumstances the Supreme Court or the 
United States held that the divorce need not be recognizt:d in New York. 
The same conclusion '\Vas reached in Strcitwol£ v. Streitwolr, 131 U. S. 179 (1901); 
in this case the husband obtained a North Dakota divorce from his New ]erEey wife. North 
Dakota required residence (domicil) for ninety days as a prerequisite to juri£diction for 
divorce. 
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1903), held that ::\13.£-"Qchusetts was not bound by 
the full faith and credit clause to recognize a divorce which the huEband had obtained in 
South Dakota, in which state neither party was domiciled, not\\ithstanding the fact that 
the wife, through her attorney, had consented to the granting or the decree. 
In Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901), the New York courts were held bound 
to recognize a divorce granted at the matrimonial domicil (Kentuclcy), in which state alone 
the spouses had lived as husband and '1\ife, although the v.ife had left the state and resumed 
her former New York domicil and was served only constructively. 
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906), decided that the New York courts need 
not recognize a Connecticut divorce obtained upon substituted Eer'lice by the husband '\vho 
had wrongfully left his New York '1\ife but had acquired a bona fide domicil in Connecticut. 
Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938), held that the parties litigating the icsue of domicil 
in the divorce court are precluded from raising the question again in another suit. 
In Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), the doctrine of the Haddad: 
case was overruled. The establishment of a bona fide domicil in Ne\-ada not ha\ing b~ 
challenged in North Carolina, the courts of that state were held bound to recognize the 
Nevada decrees, although jurisdiction over the respondents had been obtained only by 
substitutive service. 
In Williams v. North Carolina II, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092 (U.S. 1945), North Carolina chal-
lenged the acquisition of bona fide domicil in Nevada, and the Supreme Court held that it 
could do so not'l\ithstanding a finding of domicil by the Nevada courts and a recital to that 
effect upon the record. 
25. The Nevada divorces probably can '1\ithstand a direct attacl:. Says Mr. Justice 
Black, "As I read that evidence, it would have been sufficient to support the findings had 
the case been reviewed by us." Williams v. North Carolina II, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 1114 
(U. S. 1945). Indeed there is evidence in the record (though false) that the parties intended 
to make Nevada their permanent home, together '1\ith other fictitious corroborative testi-
mony. Such false or fictitious testimony, however, cannot be challenged in a direct attnck, 
the only question being whether the finding of domicil can be rea£onably sustained on the 
evidence. 
Nor can the Attorney General of Nevada bring an independent action to ret aside 
Nevada divorce decrees for fraud or collusion. The Supreme Court of Ne\-ada has held 
that the interests or the state in divorce proceedings are represented by the courtn exclu-
sively, and that the Attorney General has no power to intervene. State v. Moore, 46 Nev. 
65, 207 Pac. 75 (1922). 
HeinOnline  -- 54 Yale L.J. 808 1944-1945
808 THEY ALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54 : 799 
the latter has the constitutional power to change the marital relations 
of the spouses through divorce only if the petitioner has acquired a 
bona fide domicil in the state, the suggestion can hardly be accepted, 
for it would set the seal of approval by the Supreme Court of this 
country upon the commercialized divorce legislation, such as obtains 
in Nevada. If the requirement of a bona fide domicil cannot be at-
tacked collaterally by proof of facts occurring subsequently to the 
granting of the divorce, such as the fact that the party left the state 
immediately after obtaining the divorce, it is tantamount to holding 
that a residence of six weeks is sufficient without domicil, for in the 
great majority of cases the finding of domicil by the Nevada courts in 
these migratory divorces is based upon perjury and fictitious testi-
mony. The Supreme Court certainly cannot afford to lend its hand in 
support of such practice. Its judicial conscience is charged with knowl-
edge of the fact that the parties going to Nevada for a divorce intend to 
stay there only six weeks and then return to their former homes. That 
does not constitute domicil as understood in Anglo-American conflict of 
laws, vague and shadowy as the term may be. 
